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Resumen  
  
El  problema  del  determinismo  y  de  la  libertad  humana,  uno  
de   los   grandes  debates   filosóficos,   ha   sido  discutido  desde  
perspectivas   diferentes   productoras   de   resultados  
diferentes.   El   estadounidense   Charles   Hartshorne,   uno   de  
los   filósofos   del   proceso,   ha   hecho   una   contribución  
significativa   a   la   discusión   sobre   determinismo   y   libertad.  
Su   pensamiento   es   divisible   en   dos:   primero   está   la  
afirmación   de   que   en   el   universo   hay   un   relativo  
indeterminismo;  luego  encontramos  la  idea  según  la  cual  las  
posiciones   deterministas   y   compatibilistas   (en   sentido  
fuerte)   encuentran   serias   dificultades   teóricas   y   prácticas.  
Este  artículo  trata  sólo  de  este  último  punto.  Así,  en  primer  
lugar,  intento  describir  y  examinar  sus  objeciones  contra  los  
argumentos   que   pretenden   probar   el   determinismo   y   el  
compatibilismo,   y,   en   segundo   lugar,   examino   dos  
presuposiciones   fundamentales   de   sus   objeciones:   una   de  
ellas   es   la   falacia   de   la   carga   de   la   prueba,   y   la   otra   es   el  
error   consistente   en   recurrir   al   sentido   común  para   probar  
una  tesis  fáctica  o  metafísica.      
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Abstract  
  
The  problem  of  determinism  and  human  freedom,  which  is  
one  of   the  great  debates   in  philosophy,  has  been  discussed  
many   times   by   philosophers   who   have   very   distinctive  
perspectives   and   thereby   different   results   related   to   the  
problem.   Charles   Hartshorne   as   an   American   process  
philosopher  has  significantly  contributed  to  the  debate  with  
his   own   thoughts   and   considerations.  His   thoughts   can   be  
divided  into  two  major  parts.  First  is  the  claim  that  there  is  a  
relative   indeterminism  within   the   universe.   Second   is   that  
(hard)  determinist  and  compatibilist  positions  have   serious  
theoretical  and  practical  difficulties.  This  paper  is  only  about  
second  part  of  his  thoughts  related  to  the  debate.  So,  in  this  
paper,  firstly,  I  attempt  to  depict  and  examine  his  objections  
to   the   arguments   for  determinism  and   compatibilism.  And  
then,   secondly,   I   try   to   interrogate   two   fundamental  
assumptions   behind   his   objections.   One   is   the   fallacy   of  
burden  of  proof  and  other  is  a  fallacy  based  on  the  appeal  to  
common  sense  in  order  to  prove  any  factual  or  metaphysical  
assertion.  
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Introduction 
 
Are we really free? Or have we been always determined by previous natural conditions? On the level of 
common sense, we generally think that we could have done something different from what we actually did. But is it 
true? Indeed, can we do something different from what we actually do? In other words, what do we mean in reality 
when we say we could have done otherwise in our daily life? All these questions are very important in trying to 
give an answer to another question of who we are or who we want to be. So, it must be obviously clear that the 
problem of determinism is not merely a theoretical problem which we can easily get rid of. True, it is a great 
theoretical debate in philosophy from the old ages to our time. But it has also an existential character in terms of its 
essence for persons who search for the meaning of their life. 
Charles Hartshorne, a well-known American process philosopher, should be included among such persons. 
His philosophy embodies not only decisive intellectual argumentation but also his passionate desires and hopes of 
freedom. Hence, he strongly refuses to accept the (hard) determinist thesis meaning that everything was fully 
determined by the prior causes, events or conditions. In positing himself as an indeterminist, he appears as a 
decided opponent of determinist and even compatibilist positions on philosophical circles.  
He has made two main assertions when he vigorously attacked both determinism and compatibilism in his 
writings. One is positive claim that there is a relative indeterminism throughout the entire universe because that the 
universe has a contingent quality in its nature. He holds that the idea of a contingent universe is something provable 
-or at least reasonable-  in the light of our present knowledge about the nature if we take into consideration new 
scientific theories in physics. Other is a negative claim that determinist and compatibilist positions have faced 
serious theoretical and practical difficulties in explaining both natural and human world in a coherent and 
significant way. 
In this paper first, I shall focus merely on his negative claim and try to describe what he has really said us 
about the weakness of determinism and compatibilism. Having done this, second, I will endeavor to evaluate some 
basic assumptions under his contrary arguments and main reasoning at the concluding section. As for his positive 
claim, I will not dwell on it much more than needed for general insight of his indeterministic concept of nature and 
man. For, it requires engaging in a panpsychic theory in all its details, and this leads us to discuss the pro and con 
arguments of panpsychism. And this is another issue going beyond the limits of this paper.  
Since Hartshorne believes that burden of proof primarily rests on the determinist or the compatibilist, he 
seems to think that best strategy in defense of freedom is to directly attack their arguments and to show that serious 
defects are found within them. To him, there are both theoretical and practical difficulties of determinist and 
compatibilist theses. 
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Some Theoretical Difficulties in Determinism 
 
Hartshorne is deeply confident that absolute determinism is false in its theoretical bases, and that its falsity 
can be easily shown to those people who are sincere in their desire to know the truth1. In order to do this, first, he 
directly challenges the notion that science suggests the existence of absolute laws throughout the universe in 
support of determinism. The main assumption of the determinism is that we have to find out strict laws used for 
explaining the nature if we will take science seriously. But practice of science, says Hartshorne, has ever not 
established the existence of strict laws which determinism assumes. Observation can not give us that kind of 
certitude about the laws.2 The idea of law in sciences is indeed not a deterministic but statistical one.3 
The claim that science demands us to think deterministically must be therefore rejected on the ground of 
the statistical character of the laws.4 At that point, we see that Hartshorne many times referred to both such 
scientists as Clerk Maxwell, Gibbs, Darwin, Mendel and Bolzman who have defended statistical notion of law and 
to such indeterminist philosophers as Epicurus, Peirce, Bergson and Whitehead who were seriously concerned with 
physics as well as philosophy.5 What all those persons did set out to show is that the certitude of basic laws has 
actually depended on the large number of similarities between happening events rather than on the precise causal 
determination of the events taken singly.6  
However, is such an argument which is built on base of similarity enough to falsify the claim of the 
determinism? For instance, Cassirer has seriously attacked this similarity thesis by maintaining that if strict laws are 
statistical and thus applicable to only collectives not to individual events, then statistical laws are uncompromised 
with determinism. Statistical laws can be compromise with determinism on account of that they are applicable to 
only collectives. Despite this, they are in fact incompatible with indeterminism. For, indeterminism in opposition to 
determinism means that there must be alternative laws in nature as well as there must be different ways in which an 
individual event can occur. But, says Hartshorne, Cassirer has made only a strategic and deceiving move that we 
have to choose either order provided by determinism or chaos produced by indeterminism. The temptation here is 
that he has improperly redefined determinism and indeterminism in order to be able to posit them in contrary 
absolute stands. And hence Hartshorne directs his attack against these redefinitions by reminding us both that 
determinism is to say merely that every event in all detail is determined by its prior conditions or causes and that 
indeterminism no needs to absolutely deny the notions of regularity and causality.7  
Still, according to him, it is possible that one may use the word determinism for the mere assertion that 
                                                
1 C. Hartshorne, The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy, 1997, (ed. Mohammad Valady), Chicago: Open Court, p. 195-
196; Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-interest: A Metaphysics of Ethics”, Ethics, vol. 84, n. 3, p. 211 (1974). 
2 C. Hartshorne, “Indeterministic Freedom as Universal Principle”, Journal of Social Philosophy, v.15, n. 3, p. 9, (1984); C. Hartshorne, 
“Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, The Journal of Philosophy, v.55, n.19, p. 796 (1958). 
3 C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, 1937, (Willett, Clark Company), Chicago-New York, p.143; C. 
Hartshorne, “Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (I)”, The Journal of Philosophy, v. 29, n. 16, p. 423 (1932).  
4 C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics, 1962, Open Court Publishing, Lasalle-Illinois, p. 167. 
5 C. Hartshorne, “Indeterministic Freedom as Universal Principle”, pp. 5-6; C. Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal 
Causality”, p. 797. 
6 C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics, p. 167. 
7 Ibid, p. 181. 
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every event has its cause or causes, and indeterminism to mean that at least some events have no causes, thus 
making the issue one between two absolutes by disregarding a triadic choice including a relativistic view. But if one 
does so, then this renders indeterminism a doctrine which no one defends.8 
Once this was recognized, contends Hartshorne, we might say that universal causality is not the same as 
determinism. The different among deterministic and indeterministic definitions of cause is not related to the idea of 
whether or not every event has a cause. Rather, it is about how causes are connected to their effects.9 An 
indeterminist agrees with a determinist that every event has a cause or causes although he disagrees with him or her 
that every event is absolutely determined by its previous causes.10 Because, the cause, for Hartshorne, means a 
necessary condition for the occurrence of an event. In other words, it is a condition without which any event can not 
happen. He has thus made a distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions of any phenomena. He writes: 
“‘Necessary’ is that without which the phenomenon will not occur, ‘sufficient’ that with which it certainly will 
occur”.11 That’s, in his opinion, the latter is not identical to the former. Instead, the former is only a part of the 
latter.  
From this distinction, he maintains that the fulfillment of all necessary conditions of any event does not 
show that the event will certainly happen. The sole thing be inferred from their fulfillment is that the event may 
happen because that the effects of necessary conditions are less tangible compared to what actually happens. 
Necessary conditions only draw the limits in which the indeterminacy of the event turns into the concreteness of 
what actually happens. Hartshorne’s indeterministic perspective is obviously clear: there are neither uncaused 
happenings nor fully determined happenings.12 The causes are not sufficient to guarantee what concretely happens 
later although they are necessary in the beginning of events.13 Every event has a proportional spontaneity.14 Put 
differently, all events are not wholly determined by previous cause or causes but only conditioned by them. 
Conditioning sets limits to the effects of causes without fully determining the effects in a very strict way.15 
Given this distinction of causing and conditioning, it may be asserted that he also rejected the parallelism 
of Hume as well as determinist thesis by following Peirce, Bergson and Whitehead. Indeed, he strongly criticizes 
some basic assumptions of parallelism: Its first assumption is that (1) all necessities, regardless of being logical or 
not, must always effect the events in their all details. Hartshorne takes this assumption a bias of classical physics 
considering merely the quantitative character of the events not their qualitative one. Yet, says Hartshorne, a new 
physics as quantum mechanics stresses the qualitative aspects of the events and thus makes it possible to think that 
necessities effect the events only in their certain limited aspects. Second assumption accepts (2) necessary causal 
connections must either logical necessities connecting events with following events in their full particularity or else 
                                                
8 C. Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, p. 793. 
9 Ibid, p. 793. 
10 Ibid, p. 794. 
11 C. Hartshorne, “Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume”, The Philosophical Review, v. 63, n. 4, p. 497 (1954). 
12 C. Hartshorne, The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy, p. 195. 
13 Ibid, p.114. 
14 C. Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, p. 806. 
15 C. Hartshorne, The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy, pp. 135-136. 
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not logical necessities at all16. But Hartshorne holds that this dilemma is illogical because its dichotomy is false: 
neither every particular event is contained in its previous cause or causes, nor the word necessity has a meaning 
without being logical. Moreover, causal necessities can be logical without fully connecting the events to each other 
in their particular natures.17  
How could such a thing be possible? The answer to this question is found in his indeterminist notion of 
cause in the sense that the causes of an event provide not its actuality but only its possibilities. Actuality is much 
more than mere possibility: it is an act of becoming which no belongs to the cause but to the event itself. Here, the 
role of cause is nothing but to determine the common nature of all possibilities as regards any event.18 Causal 
necessities logically indicate only possible results, not inevitable ones. With this contention, he has suggested that 
the ‘necessary’ always means what is common to all possibilities.19 Although causal order is necessary, the idea of 
‘necessity’ need not lead us to suppose that there exists an unchangeable and fixed form of regularity throughout 
the universe.20 
As a result of this, he objects the claim that universals entirely determine their particular instances by 
applying to the concept of mathematical universals. In fact, determinism is, to him, a result of the misunderstanding 
about the relation between mathematics and knowledge of reality.21 True, each number in mathematical system has 
absolute determinate relations to other numbers. But, this abstract inner relation of mathematical systems is very 
different from concrete external relation in real world of particularities. A mathematical system is composed of 
universals or ideas, whereas the real world is made of tangible individuals or events; that’s, the laws of mathematics 
are about the ideas not real things.22 Hence, if there are universals in real world, their relation to their particular 
instances must be non-deterministic relations. It seems that here Hartshorne takes the universals ‘determinable’ not 
‘determinate’ things.23 
In this case, there are naturally no absolute equals in real world: with a simple observation about nature, 
we can see that an event A can be equal to an event B, event B to event C, and event C to event D, but we can also 
see that event A and event D are not always equal to each other in spite of all these previous equalities.24 From this 
observation, he says that nature is in its observable character contingent rather than necessary. In other words, the 
world could be otherwise. But ordinary observation is not sole evidence showing us the contingency of the nature. 
In addition to that, quantum physics has a significant role in comprehending the contingency of nature because it 
discloses the contingent character of ultimate physical particulars like the indeterminacy of the motions of electrons 
at the sub-atomic world. Consequently, the relation of universals to their particular instances can not be taken as 
                                                
16 C. Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, p. 802; C. Hartshorne, “Causal Necessities: An Alternative to 
Hume”, p. 480. 
17 C. Hartshorne, “Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume”, pp. 480-482. 
18 Ibid, p. 497. 
19 C. Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, p. 802. 
20 C. Hartshorne, “Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume”, p. 498. 
21 C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, p. 148. 
22 C. Hartshorne, Ibid, p. 133; C. Hartshorne, “Are There Absolutely Specific Universals?”, The Journal of Philosophy, v. 68, n. 3, p. 76 (1971). 
23 C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, p. 134. 
24 C. Hartshorne, “Are There Absolutely Specific Universals?”, p. 76. 
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merely a relation of necessity in no way.25  
Otherwise, we could not succeed in explaining the concepts of possibility, purpose, time and becoming 
which we often use in our daily life. But, determinism makes all of them meaningless.  
First, let’s take up the concept of ‘possibility’. Possibility, says Hartshorne, is an element of indecision 
especially concerning with the events which will happen in future. It implies what might be or might not be in the 
future.26 But, determinism argues that what actually happens now or what will occur in future is the sole thing 
which can happen. And this means that there is but one possibility and indeed that there are no possibilities at all. 
For, to speak of possibilities is to speak of alternatives in any case. If there are really no alternatives, then there is 
nothing called possibility.27 The possibility is simply reduced to that of necessity by destructing the modal contrast 
on which the senses of the terms depend. And this makes the separation of necessity and possibility disappear.28 
Second, Hartshorne goes on to urge that determinism also causes to lose the meaning of the word 
‘purpose’. For, they are universals and so are somewhat indeterminate in his understanding. If they fully determine 
what actually happen, this means that the separation of intent and its actualization would be senseless. In other 
words, for him, determinism can not be compatible with the idea of teleology.29 The fault of those who tries to 
combine determinism and teleology is found in their unseeing that utterly controlling purpose would be the sole 
purpose. Whereas, if the case really was so, the other purposes could not be ever actualized. Even have supposed 
that there are only two purposes, their accordance within real world must have still been a matter of chance which 
no intended before.30 Or else, an idea of absolute purpose would deny the individuality, chance and teleology in any 
case.31 
Third, he argues that similarly determinism makes the concept of time meaningless. In deterministic 
stance, for him, the present absolutely determines the future in its all details. But, on this case, what distinguishes 
the future from the present and even the past is any more absent. Fundamental distinctions among them have been 
entirely annihilated by determinism. Whereas, our knowledge of the world is that of events happen in the time-
world. Time can therefore be a real and open thing if and only if determinism is false. If not, the words real and 
unreal would certainly lose their sense in common language32.  
Now there is no doubt at all that Hartshorne thinks of the asymmetric character of time as only true 
understanding of time in opposition to the determinist’s notion of symmetric time which considers causal order as 
applying equally to both retrospective and prospective relations. To admit a notion of symmetric time is essentially 
to assume that cause is equal to its effect. But, Hartshorne warms us that it is a deterministic bias which can be 
named the prejudice of symmetry. For him, symmetrical ideas are derivative, but ultimate relations like causality 
                                                
25 C. Hartshorne, “Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (II)”, The Journal of Philosophy, v. 29, n. 17, p. 459 (1932). 
26 C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, p. 130. 
27 C. Hartshorne, “Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume”, p. 485. 
28 C. Hartshorne, “Indeterministic Freedom as Universal Principle”, p. 9; C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of 
Nature, p. 139. 
29 C. Hartshorne, Ibid, p. 135. 
30 C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics, p. 214. 
31 Ibid, p. 206. 
32 C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, p. 138. 
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must be non-derivative and thereby be asymmetric. Either the cause must be, for example, greater than the effect or 
vice versa. Which one is true? He writes:  
“The answer is again given by simple analysis of meanings. In a causal transaction in which, from the set 
of conditions C issues a result E, we have first C alone and then C and E. Thus the total result of causation is in 
every instance an enhancement of reality, the creation of a new whole. … Any denial of the creative aspect of 
process leads to antinomies. Thus, if it be said that when E is actual, C the cause has ceased to be, we face the 
contradiction of an alleged causal relation of E to C, although there is said to be no such thing as C to serve as term 
of this relation. And if it be said that from an ultimate or eternal point of view there is no such thing as ‘C alone,’ 
but only C as prior to E, or E as subsequent to C, then, since these two complexes are equivalent, one is defying the 
indications of logic that equality, a symmetrical relation, is derivative.”33  
What all these shows is that the problem of causality or determinism has always a dimension related to the 
problem of time and becoming. Although he has been against notion of time and principle of natural coherence 
admitted by Kant, Hartshorne has recognized that such philosophers as Kant did see the core of the issue but others 
like Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume failed to understand it.34 In other words, some things in the world are necessary, 
but some other things are contingent. Both necessity and contingency, for him, are ultimate traits of the world of 
becoming within time.35  
Having considered theoretical difficulties carefully, Hartshorne eventually draws a conclusion that 
deterministic arguments presented here are not persuasive for him, and then notices that we shouldn’t in theory 
identify determinism and causality if we sincerely want to believe that we are free in a causal world.  
 
Practical and Ethical Difficulties in Compatibilism 
 
Apart from these considerations against determinism, Hartshorne has also objected the compatibilist thesis 
which asserts both determinism and human freedom are true in real world. To compatibilists, if we can do what we 
want to do or rather if we can do it without any external coercion on our action, then it means that, whatever causal 
conditions are, we are free.36  By this claim, however, they have said that they wouldn’t mind if freedom was 
actually true or not. What they did instead is merely to redefine the freedom in a way which allows us to accept the 
notion that we could be considered free even on the condition that we were completely determined by previous 
causal conditions. He has made the point in general: “this is like telling us that we are not in chains in so far as we 
don’t mind or notice the chains”.37  
In fact, I think, he is certainly right at that point. For, they have tried to solve such a contingent issue as 
                                                
33 C. Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, p. 807. 
34 C. Hartshorne, “Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (II)”, pp. 422-423. 
35 C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics, p. 19; C. Hartshorne, “Indeterministic Freedom as 
Universal Principle”, p. 8. 
36 C. Hartshorne, “Indeterministic Freedom as Universal Principle”, p. 7. 
37 C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics, p. 19; C. Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-interest: 
A Metaphysics of Ethics”, p. 210. 
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human freedom only by a maneuver of arbitrarily redefining a crucial term. Accordingly, to rate as free, you have to 
be content with being determined. But, it is an arbitrarily chosen criterion and ultimately a matter of definition. The 
compatibilists are not maintaining to have made a real discovery about our relation to external world. They talk 
about not synthetic contingent propositions but only analytical propositions in which a crucial term are arbitrarily 
redefined somewhat contrary to its usual sense.  
Unlike this first objection, Hartshorne rejects, too, another argument of the compatibilists as regarding the 
indispensible role of motives in our processes of making a decision. Our decisions, to spokesperson of 
compatibilism, have been inevitably effected by the motives. Behind our decisions or actions, there are strong 
motives which cause us to do what we have done. Whenever we made a decision, says the compatibilist, it has been 
constantly determined by the strongest motive among others. Whereas, this is, for Hartshorne, unsound argument 
for compatibilist thesis. To see why this is so, we must consider whether or not motives are compared to each other 
in terms of establishing which of them is the strongest. He writes: “Motives cannot be measured comparatively in 
any way other than by seeing which ones do determine actions”.38  
In other words, we can establish the strongest motive only after it determines the action. But, if there is no 
way to know which motive is the strongest before the action, this requires us to accept that the argument of the 
compatibilist is nothing but a tautology. Again, a motive is indefinite thing in terms of its detailed results. If we talk 
about human beings, we should be aware of that a motive is always more or less general although that an act is in 
no way general but always particular.39 For instance, an intention to make a good impression is a general motive for 
behaving in a certain way anywhere it needs, but to speak effectively at a job interview is a particular act.  
Another unsound argument of the compatibilists is, for Hartshorne, that to accept the freedom to do 
otherwise entails to accept a new character instead of our present character. With this argument, they have assumed 
that our actions are ours only on condition that they are determined by our own character. Since we do what our 
character determines us to do, thus, our actions too are self-determined in any way. As for Hartshorne, he objects to 
this argument by showing there is an obvious contradiction here. After all, our actual self come into existence with 
the action, so it is not one of the previous causes of itself. In that case, how can it be really said that we have self-
determination?  Nonetheless, if it is said that what determines the action is our previous self not actual self, then 
what infers from this is nothing but that the action was already determined before the existence of new actual self. 
And again, this shows that we have not self-determination because that previous self cannot be exactly the same as 
actual self.40  
Indeed, not having succeeded in separating the sense and the reference of the word self, the compatibilists 
have, in my opinion, committed to the Masked Man Fallacy. For, the sense is the meaning, but the reference is the 
object to which the word refers. Since the actual self is the self after the action while previous self is the self before 
                                                
38 C. Hartshorne, “Indeterministic Freedom as Universal Principle”, p. 8. 
39 C. Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, p. 799. 
40 Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics, p. 20; C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the 
New Philosophy of Nature, p. 155. 
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the action, their referents can not be the same in any case.41 We know the former under one description, but we 
know latter under another description.  
It seems to me, for Hartshorne, this is so due to that each action produces somewhat a new character 
although our characters are generally conveyed in our actions. In his understanding, the character is unsettled, and 
hence it is, within certain limits, open to the alternative actions or probabilities. Its relation to our actions is no 
longer absolute and necessitating one.42 To him, compatibilist’s argument depends on the doctrine that becoming is 
a result of being. But, quite the reverse is true. What misleads them is that they fail to understand the inevitable role 
of time throughout the world.43 Furthermore, says Hartshorne, our capacity to form general concepts as well entails 
that we cannot be entirely determined by a settled and irresistible character.44  
On the other hand, he also attacks the moral argument that determinism is not only compatible with but 
also necessary for ethical responsibility. To compatibilists, it is certainly vain to call our actions as good or bad 
unless they are determined by previous causes including character. Because, good or bad action is, for them, a 
consequence of good or bad character.45 But, says Hartshorne, “this reasoning consists in converting the need for a 
relative form of something into a need for the absolute form of that something.”46 It is true, for him, that we need 
the idea of causality even in ethics. Nonetheless, as mentioned before, this must not bring us to concede that 
determinism and causality are the same. Further, even if two were the same, we still could not accept the moral 
argument of the compatibilist. For, he definitely rejects to acknowledge that absolute determinism could hold of the 
idea of conscious beings.47  
Similarly, he thinks that it is wrong to also present the psychoanalysis as a supporting argument for 
compatibilist thesis. To the argument, even our most variable actions are traceable to the unconscious causes. But, 
from psychoanalysis, to say determinism must be true is merely to commit the same fallacy in making a 
deterministic inference from Newtonian laws. With the principle of uncertainty, we know that observation in the 
sub-atomic world changes the observed essentially. The same is true for psychoanalysis. All observation of 
subconscious causes changes those causes. Whenever we attempted to discover them, we would make them 
inaccessible.48  
In fact, the core of the argument is the assertion that our actions are determined by our own internal nature 
rather than by any sort of external coercion upon it. From this, the compatibilists openly utter that what is crucial in 
ethics is not whether our actions are inevitable or not, but whether they belong to us or not. But, as put in the 
previous paragraphs, this claim too is another instance of the maneuver of arbitrarily redefining the word freedom. 
                                                
41 For ‘Masked Man Fallacy’, see Antony Flew, How to Think Straight: An Introduction to Critical Reasoning, 1998, Prometheus Books, New 
York, p. 31.  
42 C. Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-interest: A Metaphysics of Ethics”, p. 211. 
43 C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, p. 152. 
44 C. Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, p. 800. 
45 C. Hartshorne, Ibid, p. 793; C. Hartshorne, “Indeterministic Freedom as Universal Principle”, p. 8; C. Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-
interest: A Metaphysics of Ethics”, p. 210. 
46 C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, p. 157. 
47 C. Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-interest: A Metaphysics of Ethics”, p. 210. 
48 C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, p. 151. 
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Consequently, Hartshorne recapitulates the same objection made by James49: If we think that we couldn’t act 
differently from what we did when all conditions remained the same, then it follows necessarily that the our 
judgments of remorse or regret would lose their actual meanings in language.50  
Where this leads us is nothing but pessimism. To avoid the pessimism, therefore, we should keep ourselves 
away from determinism. Because of that, he notices, some psychiatrists have insisted upon that it is important for a 
patient to know that behavior is not totally determined by subconscious causes.51 Perhaps, to tell a patient that he is 
not free may make him feel better because it eliminates the risks and responsibilities of deciding what to do. But 
there are two unacceptable results of it: After all, this is to ultimately render human beings as less conscious being 
just like lower animals. And next, this also means to reduce the opportunities of the life as well as the risks of the 
life to triviality. Whereas, such a conclusion is, for Hartshorne, never desirable in itself.52  
His another objection related with this is that to foreknow the decisions in future, whether or not they 
results from subconscious causes or other causes, deprives them of meaning in any case. Suppose, for instance, that 
we always predict what will happen in future. Then this means to renounce the right to decide in future and thereby 
to leave all decision into the hands of our self in present. But, says Hartshorne, this is indeed not a rational and 
meaningful life. To predict the future in itself can not be the end of life. Rather, it must be to increase the good 
opportunities of future so that we can actually live our lives in future. We do not live to know before what is to 
happen but live to enjoy the present and to make wise decisions about future. Therefore, the genuine task of 
psychiatry or psychology should be to increase our freedom in the face of compulsions or constraints which limit us 
to do or not to do. Finally, unlimited predictability is in no way desirable once more again.53 Moreover, if it was 
certainly true that everything else in the universe as well as our decisions was the inescapable result of the past, 
then the universe would remain entirely unexplainable.54 
  
Conclusion 
 
As we have seen so far, Hartshorne has tried to disprove the arguments for (hard) determinism and 
compatibilism. Although there are, as I will mention a little later, some problematic assumptions in his objections, 
nonetheless, I think, he is certainly right about at least one point: problems regarding real facts of actual world can 
never be solved by only playing with language, or more clearly speaking, by merely redefining the crucial terms. 
For, such a thing leads us to talk about that which can not be said. But that is nothing but what determinist and 
compatibilist did while talking about freedom. In regard to the definitions of such words as cause, determinism, 
indeterminism, possibility, purpose, time, becoming, necessity and etc, we have seen the other instances for this 
                                                
49 William James, Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 2006, Cosimı Inc, New York, p. 163. 
50 C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, pp. 154-155. 
51 C. Hartshorne, “Indeterministic Freedom as Universal Principle”, p. 9. 
52 Ibid, p. 11. 
53 Ibid, p. 10; C. Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, pp. 801-802. 
54 Charles Hartshorne, “Meaning of Freedom (Letters to the Editor)”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: A Magazine of Science and Public 
Affairs, v. 16, n. 10, pp. 374 and 423 (1960). 
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maneuver of arbitrarily redefining the crucial terms in a discussion.  
Notwithstanding that I agree with Hartshorne on this point, yet, I must notice that there are two 
troublesome assumptions behind Hartshorne’s objections to determinism and compatibilism. First, lets the most 
noticeable of two, which we may call the fallacy of burden of proof. The burden of proof is in principle on the 
person who makes a claim or an assertion. But if you put the burden of proof on the person who rejects the claim or 
assertion, then you commit to the fallacy of burden of proof. The main idea behind this is that any claim is to be 
taken as true unless it is proved otherwise. Almost whenever Hartshorne says, from this idea, that the arguments for 
determinist or compatibilist are invalid or unsound, it seems to me, he immediately concede that his free-will thesis 
are proven as true. But, at that point, it is important to remember that no other grounds are offered for why free-will 
should be accepted as true. And this by itself is enough to see that there is something wrong in his approach. In 
other words, absent of the sound arguments for the determinist or compatibilist thesis can not be in itself an 
argument for the free-will thesis.  
One of the best examples for this fallacious reasoning could be clearly seen when he referred to the 
quantum mechanics in order to support the indeterminism. But the interpretation of the quantum mechanics is a 
disputable issue among physicists. For instance, Riggs argues that “absence of causality is not necessitated by the 
formalism of quantum mechanics. The denial of causality was a deliberate choice made in the formulation of 
Orthodox Quantum Theory.”55 The sole thing that we could infer from the data of quantum mechanics is that as if 
there is indeterminacy in subatomic world observed by us, but we do not know whether or not there is such 
indeterminacy in actual world.56  
As for his second assumption or let’s say his tactical move, it is about the appeals to common sense 
judgements in order to refuse determinist or compatibilist arguments. If we accept determinist or compatibilist 
claims, for Hartshorne, our common sense judgements -and thereby such crucial words as possibility, purpose, time 
and becoming, real or unreal etc- will definitely lose their meanings in common sense. But to appeal to common 
sense in that way is one of the informal logical fallacies. Certainly, common sense judgements neither can be used 
to establish whether or not something is true nor can they be used to dismiss another thing out of hand. For, a 
statement can not be true just because everyone knows it true. To appeal to common sense in order to prove a claim 
is, therefore, nothing but to beg the question.  
For that reason, it seems to me, the problem of determinism and free-will is not that which can be smoothly 
solved by reference to neither common sense nor who has the burden of proof. Nonetheless, as I have expressed 
elsewhere57, our sense of being free is so powerful that we can’t easily set aside our hope that we are somewhat free 
even in a causal world. By saying ‘a causal world’, as Hartshorne indicated in his writings, I mean a world which 
                                                
55 Peter J. Riggs, Quantum Causality: Conceptual Issues in the Causal Theory of Quantum Mechanics (Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 23), 2009, Springer Publications, New York, p. 182. 
56 John Searle, “The Freedom of the Will”, in Philosophy: History and Problems by Samuel Enoch Stumpt, 1994, McGraw-Hill, USA, pp. 767-
768; Robert C. Bishop, “Chaos, Indeterminism and Free Will”, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2003 (ed. Robert Kane), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, pp. 117-118. 
57 Hakan Gündoğdu, “Corliss Lamont’ta Seçme Özgürlüğü ve Belirlenimcilik Problemi” (The Problem of Determinism and Freedom of Choice 
in Corliss Lamont), Kaygı: Uludag University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Philosophy, n.8, p. 150, (2007). 
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are caused or conditioned but not completely determined by previous causes. In fact, that is exactly what 
Hartshorne has tried to show us. To put this another way, he has attempted to simultaneously solve the problems of 
randomness and freedom when he argued both that universal causality is not the same as determinism and that an 
(relative) indeterminist may agree with a determinist that every event has a cause or causes.  
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